Short answer: weak volume, but a different kind of weakness
If you are asking whether home sales are worse than in 2008 now that mortgage rates sit near 7.5%, the honest answer is that volume is very weak, but the comparison is only half fair. Real estate commentator Jon Brooks argues that pending home sales have dropped below the lows of the 2008 crash, even though the country has more people and more homes. Sales counts do look similar to, or below, the post-crisis trough in some measures.
What differs is the cause. In 2008, sales fell because credit froze, foreclosures piled up and prices collapsed. Today, the squeeze comes from payments: high prices, high rates and owners reluctant to give up cheap mortgages. That distinction matters for what happens next.
What Jon Brooks says is happening
In a video published October 1, 2026, Brooks lays out a rate-driven view of the market. His main claims, which are his interpretation and not an official data release:
- The 30-year mortgage rate crossed 7.5%, after trading around 7.37% a day earlier, as the 10-year Treasury yield rose by roughly 8.7 basis points on a single Monday.
- Rates could reach 8% by year-end, which he calls very damaging for buyers.
- Pending sales sit below 2008 lows and have "ground along the bottom" since the Fed began hiking in March 2022.
- There are 57.9% more home sellers than buyers, which he describes as a record surplus. He does not name the source; a measure like this typically comes from listing-platform data, so treat it as unverified until you can trace it.
- In his home market of Jacksonville, Florida, pending sales are down another 10% to 20%, and local agents, he says, mostly describe prices as down 5% to 7% over 12 months.
He also points to a national median price up about 2.1% and argues that figure is distorted by a product-mix effect: if more expensive homes sell and fewer entry-level homes do, the median rises even if individual homes are not gaining value.
The payment math behind the slowdown
The strongest part of Brooks's argument is arithmetic. Higher rates shrink what a given monthly budget can borrow. He uses a rule of thumb that each one-point rise in the rate cuts purchasing power by about 10%. That holds up reasonably well. The table below shows principal-and-interest payments on a $100,000 loan at a 30-year fixed term (our calculation, excluding taxes and insurance).
| Mortgage rate | Monthly payment per $100,000 | Change vs 6% |
|---|---|---|
| 3% | about $422 | about 30% lower |
| 6% | about $600 | baseline |
| 7% | about $665 | about 11% higher |
| 7.5% | about $699 | about 17% higher |
| 8% | about $734 | about 22% higher |
Put differently, the same monthly payment that supports a $400,000 loan at 6% supports roughly $343,000 at 7.5%. For a buyer who had planned around the dip toward 6% that Brooks says the market briefly enjoyed, that is a meaningful loss of budget.
Brooks also says that going from 3% to 7% cut purchasing power by about 40%. Using the same math, it is closer to 37%, but the point stands: the post-2021 shift was enormous.
He ties this to an income gap: roughly $126,000 of household income needed to qualify for a typical purchase versus about $86,000 for the average household, a gap of around 47%. He does not cite the source, so treat these as illustrative.
For more on why rate moves ripple through the market, see our explainer on why the US housing market is frozen as mortgage rates near 7.5% and our look at the 10-year Treasury yield spike and what it means for mortgages.
Is the 2008 comparison fair?
Start with what the data series actually measure. The National Association of Realtors publishes two monthly gauges. Existing-home sales count closings of previously owned homes. The Pending Home Sales Index tracks signed contracts, which lead closings by a month or two. Brooks's claim concerns pending sales. Contract activity is seasonally adjusted and revised, so a single month's reading is a shaky basis for "worse than 2008."
Here is how the two periods differ in the factors that matter most:
| Factor | 2008 | Today (per Brooks and general context) |
|---|---|---|
| Main driver of weak sales | Credit crunch, foreclosures, falling values | Affordability, high rates, owner lock-in |
| Prices | Falling sharply nationwide | Near records nationally, falling in some metros |
| Population and housing stock | Smaller | Larger, so turnover rate is lower |
| Mortgage rates | Roughly 6% | Near 7.5% per Brooks |
| Distressed sales | Large share | Small share nationally, rising in places |
On raw volume, the point holds: annual existing-home sales in recent years have hovered near 4 million, levels not seen since the mid-1990s, even though the country has far more households than back then. Brooks emphasizes this population angle, and it is a fair one. A sales rate that was normal for a smaller housing stock looks much weaker today.
On the cause, however, the comparison is misleading. In 2008, nationwide home values were in a steep decline and many owners owed more than their homes were worth. Today most owners hold large equity. That is why forced selling is limited, and why prices have not collapsed even as sales dried up. For a deeper look at how tight supply and lock-in interact, see our piece on Freddie Mac's silver tsunami warning.
A market that looks different depending on where you stand
Brooks stresses that housing is local, and that national headlines hide the divergence. His observations:
- Sun Belt overbuilding. He cites Austin, Raleigh, Houston, Orlando, Seattle and parts of Georgia as places that built heavily and where expected demand did not arrive. He also names Colorado, Washington and Arizona as areas showing stress.
- Florida migration. He says net domestic migration to Florida has dropped about 93% from its peak and international migration about 70%, which he sees as a major drag beyond interest rates.
- Tight, wealthy coastal metros. San Francisco, San Diego and the Northeast hold up, he argues, because supply is limited and high earners, including those benefiting from AI wealth, are still buying.
- Builders. He says new-home incentives can reach 12% to 13% off the list price, using mortgage rate buydowns and upgrades, and that Lennar has cut prices from the 2022 peak. Sellers of resale homes compete directly with those deals.
If you are tracking Florida specifically, our reports on Florida home price declines in 2026 cover the weakest cities in more detail.
Brooks also notes that Florida investors account for about 30% of purchases and are starting to pull back, because a 10-year Treasury yielding more than many property cap rates offers income with less work. He says over $1 trillion of commercial real estate debt needs refinancing over the next two years. That is a forecast and a claim worth checking against lender and Federal Reserve data.
Limits and counterpoints to the creator's view
Brooks is open about being a commentator and invites disagreement. A few cautions are worth keeping in mind:
- Mixed signals on prices. He acknowledges that median prices are up about 2%. Different indexes, including repeat-sales measures such as Case-Shiller or Zillow's value index, can tell a different story from medians.
- Rates are not the only driver. He concedes demographics, migration and inventory matter. Attributing the whole slowdown to the Fed's March 2022 pivot is a simplification.
- Shortage versus surplus. He rejects the idea of a national housing shortage and says builders promote it. Many economists, including researchers at Freddie Mac and others, estimate a multi-million-home deficit, concentrated in particular regions and price tiers. Both can be partly true: shortages in expensive coastal metros and surpluses in overbuilt Sun Belt suburbs.
- Timing claims. His view that Fed hikes take six to eight months to hit the economy, and that "pain" arrives next year, is a general rule of thumb. Lags vary.
- Unnamed sources. Several numbers, including the 57.9% seller surplus and the pending-sales comparison, are shown on screen without a stated source. Verify before relying on them.
- Rate level. A daily rate tracker can differ from the Freddie Mac weekly average. The 7.5% figure may not match survey-based measures.
What this means for you
If you are a buyer. Think in monthly payments, not headline prices. Run your budget at today's rate and at 8% to see your cushion. Brooks calls adjustable-rate mortgages risky; they can offer a lower initial rate but carry reset risk, so compare carefully. Ask sellers and builders about credits and rate buydowns, which may be worth more than a small price cut. Compare new construction incentives with resale listings.
If you are a seller. Price against current competition, not what sold six months ago. Include new-construction deals that your buyers will weigh. Expect more repair negotiations and closing-cost requests, which Brooks says are making deals harder to hold together, especially with FHA-financed local buyers. Choose an agent with recent comparable sales in your specific neighborhood.
If you are a homeowner who is not selling. A low fixed rate is a valuable asset. Brooks argues life events such as death, divorce or job change will gradually push owners out of their cheap mortgages, but that is not likely to ease supply quickly. See our analysis of the frozen market.
If you are a small investor. Compare expected net operating income to Treasury yields and to your refinancing risk. Insurance and tax increases can erode returns.
None of this is personalized advice; speak to a licensed lender, agent or financial advisor about your situation.
What to watch next
- Freddie Mac's weekly survey to confirm whether the average 30-year rate has really moved past 7.5%.
- NAR's next existing-home and pending-home reports for volume and median-price trends.
- 10-year Treasury yields, which tend to lead mortgage rates.
- Local inventory and price-cut counts from Redfin, Realtor.com and Zillow in your metro.
- New-home incentives from large builders, which can signal how much pressure sits in the market.
Brooks expects a weak close to the year as the busy season ends. The data will show whether that holds, or whether the "worse than 2008" framing proves to be about volume alone.