Multifamily Debt Maturity Wall: $757 Billion Comes Due by 2028

How big is the multifamily debt maturity wall?

Apartment owners in the US carry roughly $1.8 trillion in debt, and a large share of it must be repaid or refinanced soon. In a video published October 6, 2026, the creator Michael Bordenaro Clips cites Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) figures showing about $757 billion in apartment loans maturing between now and 2028. The pressure point is simple: many of those loans were written when money was cheap, and they will be replaced at far higher rates, against properties whose rents have stopped climbing.

That combination is what analysts call a "maturity wall." It does not mean every landlord fails. It means a concentrated block of borrowers must make a decision at the same time: refinance at a higher cost, inject fresh cash, sell, or hand the keys back to the lender.

This article walks through the numbers the video cites, explains the mechanics, and separates what the data support from what is opinion.

The numbers behind the wall

Michael Bordenaro Clips lays out the scale year by year. These are the figures as presented in the video, attributed to the MBA:

Two cautions. First, the video does not reconcile its annual figures with the $757 billion total, and the time window is loosely described, so treat the pieces as approximate until you check the MBA's own tables. Second, "maturing" does not mean "defaulting." Most of these loans will be paid off with new loans. The risk lies in whether replacement financing is available, and at what price.

For the original series, see the MBA's commercial and multifamily research pages, linked in the sources below.

Why higher rates turn a routine refinance into a problem

Most apartment buildings are financed with debt, usually short- or medium-term loans that are not fully paid down by maturity. The owner expects to refinance at the end of the term. That works when rates are stable or falling and when the building's income has grown.

Bordenaro points to the contrast with 2020 and 2021, when he says an investor could borrow at about 3% and apartments were among the most sought-after assets. Rents were rising at double-digit rates in many markets then, which supported high purchase prices.

Today the inputs have flipped:

• Higher borrowing costs. A bigger interest bill cuts into the building's net operating income.
• Lower valuations. Lenders size loans on income and a property's value. If rents are flat and borrowing costs are high, the building supports a smaller loan.
• The gap. When the new loan is smaller than the old one, the owner has to cover the difference with cash, which is called a "cash-in refinance."

He cites an example from Raleigh, North Carolina: an investor who bought five years ago holds a 3.5% rate and would face about 6% on a new loan. According to the video, that investor is weighing a sale rather than writing a large check. That is one anecdote, but it illustrates the arithmetic many owners face. For a wider look at what has driven long-term borrowing costs higher, see our explainer on the 10-year Treasury yield spike and mortgage rates.

Delinquencies and distress: what the video reports

The video cites several data points on stress:

• Delinquency rate. Multifamily loan delinquencies were 1% in October 2023 and have climbed to 7.1%, which the creator attributes to Morgan Stanley and describes as the biggest increase of any major commercial property type.
• Value decline. The creator says apartment values fell 3.5% in the past month and now sit more than 20% below their 2022 peak. He treats that as a "crash" under his own definition of a decline of more than 20% in four years.
• Mortgage rates. A chart shown in the video suggests multifamily mortgage rates are back near levels last seen in 2006 and 2007.
• Blackstone. The investment firm reportedly defaulted on a $90 million loan in June on a building it bought in 2021.
• S2 Capital. The Dallas-based sponsor has reportedly run up about $400 million of loan defaults on a Sunbelt apartment portfolio, dissolved its multifamily fund and told investors they would not get their money back.
• Discounts. The creator says some landlords are preparing to sell at 50% to 90% below their purchase price.

Where a figure is a precise statistic from a named data provider, such as the delinquency rate, it is worth verifying against the original report. Delinquency series differ by source. Some track commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), others cover bank or agency loans, and rates can look very different across them.

Why the Sunbelt is in the spotlight

Bordenaro names Phoenix, Denver, Atlanta and Austin as markets where a surge of new apartment construction has flooded the rental market. More supply means landlords compete for tenants, which usually shows up as concessions such as a month or two of free rent, or slower rent growth.

The same metros also feature in the home-sale story. Bordenaro says several of them have roughly twice as many sellers as buyers. Our coverage of record housing inventory and of falling buyer demand and seller price cuts shows the same pattern from the for-sale side: supply has risen while buyers hold back because of costs.

He also notes that some developers are pausing new projects in favor of buying distressed buildings at a discount. That is a plausible response to cheaper existing assets, and it could eventually shrink the pipeline of new apartments, which is relevant for rents several years out.

Rent forecasts: the creator's skepticism

One of the sharper arguments in the video concerns rent forecasts. Bordenaro says CoStar now expects rents to rise 1.9% by the end of this year, up from a previous forecast of 0.5%. He disputes this, arguing that rents are falling, not rising, and that landlords are counting on increases to rescue their finances. He also expresses doubt about forecasts from other firms such as Zillow, Redfin and CoreLogic.

As an anecdote, he says he pays about $300 a month less than a year ago for a comparable furnished short-term rental in Marin County, California. That is one data point and does not represent the national market.

Readers should note that rent trends depend on the measure used. Asking rents on new listings, in-place rents for existing tenants, and effective rents (after concessions) can move differently. Public sources like the Census Bureau's Housing Vacancy Survey and private listing indexes are better guides than any one forecast.

Limits and counterpoints to the creator's view

Bordenaro's framing is strongly bearish, and some of it goes beyond what the data can prove.

• Maturities are not defaults. Lenders frequently extend loans, modify terms or accept partial paydowns rather than foreclose, particularly when selling into a weak market would crystallize losses. Distress can drag on for years instead of hitting at once.
• The word "crash" is subjective. A 20% fall from a peak is notable, but the definition is the creator's own, and valuations for private buildings are estimates, not transaction prices.
• Averages hide big differences. A well-located, well-maintained building with fixed-rate agency financing is in a very different position from a recently purchased, floating-rate value-add deal.
• Large losses are not universal. Discounts of 50% to 90% likely describe the worst cases, usually highly leveraged purchases at 2021 peak prices.
• Renters' savings vary. The claim that renters save 30% to 50% a month versus owning depends on the city and the property type. Our rent vs. buy analysis explains why the answer changes with price, rate and time horizon.
• Landlord stress doesn't always hurt tenants. The risk of deferred maintenance is real in some distressed buildings, but many owners keep operating normally while they work out their debt.

What this means for you

This is general information, not personalized financial advice.

If you rent

Competition among landlords in oversupplied markets can give you room to ask for concessions or hold the line on a renewal increase. Compare nearby listings, check what's being offered in effective-rent terms, and weigh the cost of moving. If your building changes hands or the owner appears financially strained, document maintenance requests in writing and read your lease for renewal and notice terms.

If you are buying a home

Weaker apartment rents can slightly ease pressure on rental demand, but the apartment debt story does not directly set mortgage rates for a single-family purchase. Negotiating leverage depends on your local market's inventory and days on market. Concessions such as rate buydowns or closing-cost credits are worth asking about where sellers are motivated.

If you are a seller or homeowner

A flood of rental supply can pull some would-be buyers toward renting, particularly in the Sunbelt. If you are selling in an oversupplied metro, expect price-conscious buyers and plan for competitive pricing. Owners with fixed-rate mortgages are not directly exposed to the maturity wall.

If you invest in apartments or real estate funds

Check the debt terms behind any syndication or fund: maturity dates, whether the rate is fixed or floating, reserve levels and the sponsor's track record. The S2 Capital example shows how investor capital can be lost when a leveraged strategy meets higher rates. Past performance from a low-rate era says little about the current cycle.

What to watch next

• MBA maturity data and updates for 2027 and 2028, which will show whether the 2028 peak materializes as described.
• Delinquency reports from CMBS trackers, banks and agencies, to see if the rise to 7.1% continues or levels off.
• The Federal Reserve and the 10-year Treasury yield, which shape refinancing costs. Freddie Mac's weekly Primary Mortgage Market Survey tracks home mortgage rates, a related but separate market.
• Rent and vacancy data from the Census Bureau and large listing sites, to gauge whether concessions are widening.
• Distressed sales volume, which will show if owners sell or lenders extend.

For a regional example of rising distress in a different segment, see our report on Florida delinquent home sales.

The bottom line

The multifamily debt maturity wall is a real and measurable pressure: hundreds of billions of dollars in apartment loans reaching term while rates are higher and new supply has softened rent growth. The creator's central point, that borrowers who took cheap loans in 2020 and 2021 face an expensive reset, is reasonable. His stronger claims about 50% to 90% losses and a full-blown apartment "crash" rest on selected examples and his own definitions. The most likely outcome is uneven stress, with the weakest, most leveraged owners selling or losing buildings while better-capitalized landlords negotiate extensions and wait.